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Abstract
We describe a new proposal for a trap-door one-way function. The new proposal belongs to
the “multivariate quadratic” family but the trap-door is different from existing methods, and is
simpler.
Known quantum algorithms do not appear to help an adversary attack this trap-door. (Be-
yond the asymptotic square-root-speedup which applies to all oracle search problems.)
Keywords: Multivariate quadratic cryptosystem, MinRank, tensor rank, post-quantum
cryptography.
1 Introduction
The requirement that a one-way function also possess a trap-door appears to impose considerable
algebraic structure on the function. Such structure is a security risk, and that risk has increased
with the development of quantum algorithms that can efficiently detect specific algebraic structures
that are conjecturally opaque to classical algorithms. As is well known, all “abelian” cryptosystems
(RSA, Diffie-Hellman, El Gamal, elliptic curve, Buchmann-Williams) have been broken due to the
ability of a quantum computer to solve the hidden subgroup problem (HSP) in abelian groups in
polynomial time [78, 76, 14, 43, 68].
It is necessary therefore to devise trap-doors (and other cryptographic primitives) with an eye to the
particular computational advantages of quantum computers. Honest parties should still require only
classical computation. (This is sometimes called “post-quantum cryptography”.) There are three
main classes of candidates for such cryptosystems. In each case, part of the argument for hardness
is the NP-hardness of a closely related problem (a more general case, or nearby parameters);
this cannot truly justify a cryptosystem [15] but helps argue first that there may be no sub-
exponential time classical algorithm and second that quantum algorithms may have little advantage
over classical ones [11]. These three classes of cryptosystems are:
(1) Lattice cryptosystems [2, 54, 70, 52, 69, 55, 53, 56] rely upon the hardness of the HSP in
dihedral groups [70]. This assumption is particularly attractive due to the fact that it can be
worst-case rather than average-case [1]. However the quantum version of this hardness assumption
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is in question because two positive results are known about dihedral HSP: (a) Single-register coset
measurements are information-theoretically sufficient to solve the problem [33]. By contrast this
is known to be false for more general HSP problems (e.g., in Sn) [45, 41, 58, 44], and proposed
multi-register measurements [34, 6, 7] do not seem to lead toward an efficient algorithm. (b) An
elegant and nontrivial algorithm is known for the problem [49] (and see [71]), running in time ∼ 2
√
n
on groups of size 2n. By contrast it is known that this algorithm does not work in Sn [59].
(2) Code-based cryptosystems: McEliece and its relatives [51, 60]. The security of these cryp-
tosystems is based the problem of decoding a random linear error-correcting code. However, the
security of the system is known to depend upon the choice of the rapidly-decodable error-correcting
code that forms its trap-door, to an extent that was not originally apparent [74, 75, 18, 19]. So
far, instantiation of the method with randomly-chosen Goppa codes seems to be secure. However,
the originally-proposed parameters have been shown to be insufficient (see [12], based on an attack
in [80]). Also, a recent attack [36] has been effective, in a certain parameter range, against the prob-
lem of distinguishing a random Goppa code generator matrix from a random matrix; the hardness
of this problem had been employed as one of the bases for security of the McEliece cryptosystem.
(3) “Multivariate polynomial” cryptosystems. In these systems the security is based on the hard-
ness of solving systems of polynomial equations in finite fields (even constant-size fields), a problem
that is known to be NP-hard (even for “multivariate quadratic” systems, henceforth “MQ”); more
importantly this problem appears to be hard on average for a random system of equations. Trap-
doors for such systems require designing a system of equations that is (in some helpful way) not fully
random, yet is almost as hard for an adversary to solve. There has been a long sequence of work
on such proposals (for a survey through 2005 see [90]), beginning with [50], which was cracked by
Patarin [66], who then replaced that method by a more flexible generalization [67] called HFE; the
most basic form of HFE has been cracked [48, 30, 37, 40], as have some variants [32], but more gen-
eral forms (HFEv- used in Quartz), appear to remain viable with appropriate parameters [26, 31],
although perhaps not as efficient as one might wish [86]. Broadly speaking all MQ cryptosystems
are subject to attack by Gro¨bner basis algorithms for solving systems of polynomial equations, the
leading method currently being Fauge`re’s F5 algorithm; the key question is whether the systems
of polynomials generated by the cryptosystem have features that enable such an algorithm to run
in sub-exponential time.
Quantum algorithms have not been shown to possess any advantage over classical algorithms in
solving systems of polynomial equations (other than the slight “Grover search” advantage [42]),
despite a few successful attacks (see [20, 21] for some representatives) on problems that lack obvious
linear, abelian, or normal group structure. For this reason, MQ cryptosystems are particularly
promising for post-quantum cryptography.
Our work. In this paper we present an extremely simple multivariate-quadratic trap-door. As
the details are neither long nor difficult, we do not give an overview, and only mention the following
points for readers familiar with existing methods:
(a) Honest-party decryption is simpler than in previous methods. The run-time is dominated by
inversion of a linear-sized GF2 matrix.
(b) Unlike earlier methods, the method is specific to the field GF2.
(c) We are aware of three main vulnerabilities of our method: an attack through the “MinRank”
problem, an attack through “relinearization” and related methods, and an attack through the
“LRTD” problem of finding low-rank tensor decompositions of low-rank tensors. We discuss these
attacks in the body of the paper. We present two different versions of our method, “plain” and
“+”, with differing exposures to an LRTD attack.
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2 Definitions
Fix the field F = GF2. Throughout, we use vector spaces U ∼= Fn1 , V ∼= Fn2 , and W ∼= Fn3 , and
write T = U ⊗V ⊗W . This is a space of tensors of order 3 or “3-tensors”. Taking U † = Hom(U,F)
(etc.), there is an implied mapping from T×U † to 2-tensors (elements of V ⊗W ), from T×(U †×V †)
to 1-tensors, etc. These mappings are restrictions of the contraction mappings, for example, the
two-index contraction which carries T ∈ T and A ∈ U † ⊗ V † to a vector T · A ∈ W . As usual “·”
indicates dot product or contraction of vectors in a space and its dual.
Likewise, the group G = GL(U)×GL(V )×GL(W ) acts on T. (By definition, on the right.)
If we fix a basis for one of these vector spaces, e.g., (e1, . . . , en1) for U , there is an implied dual
basis (e†1, . . . , e
†
n1) for U
† in which e†iej = δij ; if ei are specified in terms of another underlying basis,
then the e†i are specified (in terms of the dual of the underlying basis) by inverting the matrix of
ei’s.
Tensors have a few easily-computed invariants under the action of G, such as the dimensions of the
six vector spaces T × U †, T × V †, T ×W †, T × (V † ×W †), T × (U † ×W †), T × (U † × V †).
Another invariant is tensor rank:
Definition 1. A (T; r)-tensor is one which can be expressed as
T =
r∑
i=1
ui ⊗ vi ⊗ wi
for some vectors u1, . . . , ur ∈ U , v1, . . . , vr ∈ V , w1, . . . , wr ∈W .
When we wish to focus on the dimensions of U, V,W , we refer to such a tensor as an (n1, n2, n3; r)-
tensor.
Definition 2. The rank of a tensor T ∈ T is the least r such that T is a (T; r)-tensor.
The tensor rank of an n × n × n tensor can be, and by a counting argument almost always is,
quadratic in n. The maximum attainable rank is unknown, but lies between n2/3 and d3n2/4e [47]
(a better upper bound of n(n+ 1)/2 holds for algebraically closed fields [61]). The rank of a tensor
is at least as large as the dimensions of the one-tensor and two-tensor spaces mentioned above, but
those are usually poor lower bounds.
Unlike the previous invariants, tensor rank is apparently difficult to compute. H˚astad [46] showed
that the problem “Is rank T ≤ k” is NP-complete over finite fields.
3 Trap-door one-way functions from rank-planted bilinear map-
pings
3.1 Bilinear mappings
In what follows we take n = n1 = dimU = n2 = dimV and m = n3 = dimW . We now think of T
as the space of bilinear mappings
T : U † × V † →W
T (x, y) = T · (x⊗ y)
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or, in coordinates,
(T (x, y))k =
∑
i,j
Ti,j,kxiyj for k ∈ {1, . . . ,m}.
The bilinear inversion problem is, given T ∈ T and z ∈W , find x and y such that T (x, y) = z.
As is well known, the bilinear inversion problem is NP-complete. (This is true also of inverting the
mapping x→ T (x, x).) We go further and conjecture average-case hardness of bilinear inversion:
Conjecture 3. For any 0 < α < 1, any inversion algorithm A, and any c > 0, with m =
n1+α, there is a β > 0 such that the probability (over T, x, y selected uniformly, and any internal
randomness of A) that A on input (T, T (x, y)) outputs (T, x, y) within time 2n
β
, is less than n−c.
Let pT = the probability (over x, y selected uniformly, and any internal randomness of A) that A
on input (T, T (x, y)) outputs (T, x, y) within time 2n
β
. The above conjecture also implies that: For
any 0 < α < 1, any inversion algorithm A, and any c > 0, with m = n1+α, there is a β > 0 such
that the probability (over T selected uniformly) that pT > n
−c is less than c. (Substitute 2c in the
conjecture.)
It will be a considerably stronger conjecture that this hardness holds also for the special rank-
planted tensors that are used in the trap-door.
3.2 Rank-planted bilinear mappings
For the security of the “plain” variant of our trap-door proposal we need bilinear inversion to remain
hard on average even in the following restricted scenario. As above (and throughout) set m = n1+α
for 0 < α < 1.
Definition 4. The Dn,m-distribution on tensors T in T is the following probability distribution:
sample independently and uniformly u1, . . . , um ∈ U , v1, . . . , vm ∈ V , and nonsingular w ∈ Hom(W,W );
let wi denote the i’th row of w. Form
T =
m∑
i=1
ui ⊗ vi ⊗ wi.
3.3 Trap-door: “plain” variant
Sample T from the distribution Dn,m for m = n
1+α. The public key is T , and the private key is the
decomposition u1, . . . , um ∈ U , v1, . . . , vm ∈ V , w1, . . . , wm ∈ W . As before, the one-way function
is the bilinear map T : F2n → Fm, (x, y)→ T (x, y) = z.
These bilinear functions seem to be (almost always) hard to invert without the private key, although
of course the distribution on instances disables the NP-hardness (this is unavoidable since a trap-
door for an NP-hard problem would put NP into P or BPP or BQP, depending on the resources
required by the honest inverter [15]). Inversion is no harder than the tensor decomposition problem;
this truly seems hard, although we have limited evidence for this claim. We discuss the question
at greater length at the end of the paper in the context of the literature on tensor rank bounds.
The tensors in H˚astad’s reduction have the following superficial similarity to the ones we use: one
of the three dimensions is longer than the other two and the rank of the tensors is at most linear
in that longer dimension. However, the rank in that reduction could be as much as three times the
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longer dimension, rather than exactly equal. The distinction is significant: if one takes m = O(n),
a MinRank attack for bilinear inversion is expected to run in polynomial time in the exactly-equal
case but not when the rank is larger by a constant factor greater than 1 (see Sec. 4.1).
The trap door. Given the low rank decomposition (the private key), we can invert the mapping
T as follows. Write the `th bit of z as
z` = (T (x, y))` =
∑
(wi)`(x · ui)(y · vi)
Linearize this quadratic system of equations by letting si = (x · ui)(y · vi). By construction, the
matrix w (whose i’th row is wi) is invertible. Therefore we can solve for s given z.
The key observation is that when si = 1, it follows that x ·ui = 1 and y · vi = 1. (The si = 0 values
are computationally less useful.)
Now consider any fixed x 6= 0n and y 6= 0n. We can compute x from s provided that there are n
linearly independent vectors ui for which si = 1. Likewise, we can compute y from s provided that
there are n linearly independent vectors vi for which si = 1. In short, we can obtain x and y from
s provided the following event A happens: There is a collection of indices I ⊆ {1, . . . ,m} such that
1. x · ui = 1 for all i ∈ I,
2. y · vi = 1 for all i ∈ I,
3. {ui}i∈I span U ,
4. {vi}i∈I span V .
We argue that this occurs with high probability. Let c = m/n; b > 0 will be specified below. Picking
pairs (ui, vi) uniformly iid, there is, by a Chernoff bound [79], probability ≥ 1 − e−2(c/4−b)2n that
there exists a subset of these, I, of cardinality ≥ bn satisfying conditions 1, 2.
The vectors {ui}i∈I are uniformly distributed subject to condition 1. For convenience label I =
{1, . . . , bn}. The probability that condition 3 fails is equal to the probability that the collection
{ui−u1}i∈I fails to span the hyperplane x⊥. For i ≥ 2 write u′i = ui−u1; observe that the vectors
u′2, . . . , u′bn are iid uniform in x
⊥. In order that they not span x⊥, all of u′n, . . . , u′bn must lie in
Span(u′2, . . . , u′n−1); this occurs with probability at most 2n−1−bn.
Likewise the vectors {vi}i∈I are uniformly distributed subject to condition 2 and so the probability
that condition 4 fails is also bounded by 2n−1−bn.
In combination,
Pr[x and y can be obtained from z by this procedure] ≥ 1− e−2(c/4−b)2n − 2−(b−1)n.
Now taking a union bound over all x 6= 0n and y 6= 0n,
Pr[for all nonzero x and y the bilinear mapping is invertible by this procedure] ≥ 1−22n(e−2(c/4−b)2n+2−(b−1)n).
For any value of c this is maximized with the choice b− 1 = 2(c/4− b)2 lg e, or
b =
c
4
+
1
4 lg e
−
√
c
8 lg e
+
1
16 lg2 e
− 1
2 lg e
.
We have c = nα. Using the above formula for b we have
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Theorem 5. With probability ≥ 1−22n+1−(nα/4−nα/2/
√
8 lg e−O(1))n = 1−2−n1+α/4+n1+α/2/
√
8 lg e+O(n)
(over the choice of the private key), the bilinear mapping is invertible by the above procedure on the
images of all inputs x 6= 0, y 6= 0.
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We now discuss a few points.
PKE Preprocessing. Obtaining a public-key cryptosystem with semantic security requires some
pre-processing in order to make the encryptions random; in an MQ system, as discussed already by
Patarin [67], one must also avoid the following attack (a version of a well-known attack on RSA). If
the encrypter can be induced to provide not only T (x, y) but also T (x+ δx, y+ δy) for some known
(and generic) vectors δx ∈ U , δy ∈ V , then x and y can be recovered from the resulting system of
linear equations. It is easy to protect against this weakness in the usual ways (padding x and y by
random bits in each application of T , or—if semantic security is not required—by some nonlinear
mapping, e.g., a cryptographic hash function).
Self-reducible alternative: A drawback of the above method is that we do not know a worst-
to-average-case reduction. That is, there may be a large (even constant-probability) set of tensors
for which the rank-planted bilinear inversion problem is easy, even though on the remaining set of
tensors it is hard. This seems unlikely but cannot presently be ruled out, because we do not have
a self-reducibility argument. The difficulty in providing such an argument is that the only way we
know how to generate from a tensor T another of equivalent rank, is to act on T with some g ∈ G.
The orbit of T under G, while large (of size 2Θ(m
2)), is yet vanishingly small inside T (which is
of size 2Θ(n
2m)). This suggests an alternative method, which is to base the cryptosystem upon a
single well-chosen rank-m tensor T0, and to generate keys by sampling g uniformly in G and setting
T = T0g.
However it seems unlikely that the self-reducibility gained is worth the loss in key size and the
increased vulnerability to a solution to the tensor isomorphism problem (i.e., given two tensors
T, S in the same orbit under G, find g ∈ G such that Tg = S). (Although we have every reason to
think that the tensor isomorphism problem requires exponential time even for quantum algorithms.)
Also, at present (as just discussed), we have no guidelines to prefer any particular T0 over another.
4 Vulnerabilities and variations
4.1 MinRank vulnerability
Like existing MQ cryptosystems, but for different reasons, this one is subject to a MinRank-based
attack that will reveal the private key. The MinRank problem [30] is: Given a collection of n× n
matrices (viewed as elements of a vector space) and a parameter 1 ≤ r < n, find a matrix of rank
≤ r in their linear span. (Alternatively, decide whether one exists; or, consider r as an output to
be minimized.)
A “slice” of a tensor T in this paper will always mean a matrix T∗∗` for some value of `. The set
of rank 1 linear combinations of the slice matrices {T∗∗`}m`=1 in the “plain” variant includes all the
matrices {ui ⊗ vi}mi=1. It is unlikely to include any other rank 1 matrices. (This is slightly delicate
and to be formal is stated here as a Speculation: The probability that the span of {T∗∗`}m`=1 contains
any rank 1 matrix outside {ui⊗ vi}mi=1 is 2−Ω(n
2/m). An algorithm which outputs the full listing of
rank 1 matrices in the span of the slices can invert the bilinear mapping, unless the length of that
6
list approaches m/4, which appears to be extraordinarily unlikely. Although we are not confident
enough of the particular probability bound to call the speculation a conjecture, we do conjecture
an exponentially small bound; if this is somehow false, then the MinRank attack might not apply
against the trap-door.)
MinRank (as a decision problem) is NP-hard, as is the special case r = n − 1 (deciding whether
there exists a singular matrix in the span of given matrices). Even an inapproximability result
is known for MinRank, and in fact for the following somewhat easier problem, studied by Buss,
Frandsen and Shallit [17]: Given a collection of n × n matrices M0,M1, . . . ,Mk which are entry-
wise disjoint (for any i, j, at most one M `i,j is nonzero), find the least rank r of any matrix in
M0 + Span(M1, . . . ,Mk). They showed that it is NP-hard to approximate r to within a 1 + ε factor
for any ε < 7/520. (Their problem reduces to MinRank simply by letting M0 range over the list of
matrices.)
The MinRank task which needs to be performed here is a little different from the usual one of
exhibiting some matrix of minimal rank r. On the one hand, we are in the special case r = 1,
and this makes the problem much easier than the general case; on the other hand we need the
algorithm to output all (or close to all) of the matrices of minimal rank, which in principle makes
the problem harder. However, the “kernel attack” on MinRank ([22, 23, 48, 39]), which works well
for small r, has the property of providing the full listing of minimal rank matrices in no more time
than it provides one such matrix. This algorithm runs in time 2mr/npoly(mn). The idea is simple:
let t ∈W † be any vector such that rank(T · t) ≤ r. Choose dm/ne vectors x1, . . . xdm/ne uniformly,
independently in U †. If all lie in ker(T · t) (and are in general position) then the ndm/ne equations
{(T · t) · xi}i suffice to determine t. The probability of this occurring is approximately 2−mr/n.
For recent bounds on MinRank computations (including the kernel attack and another attack less
applicable to our parameters) see [35].
For our trap-door this implies an attack running in time ∼ 2nα .
4.2 Relinearization / Gro¨bner basis vulnerability
This vulnerability helps invert the bilinear function without necessarily revealing the private key.
Our bilinear mappings are easily invertible if m is taken to be at least
(
n
2
)
, because one may then
linearize the system: define variables aij = xiyj and solve T ·a = T (x, y). This is, of course, simply
exploiting the extension of the map T from U † × V † to U † ⊗ V †. An interesting extension of this
method, called relinearization, was introduced by Kipnis and Shamir [48]; they gave complexity
estimates supporting polynomial-time inversion for m = εn2 for any fixed ε > 0. An optimization
called XL was later introduced [27], and see [29, 28] for variations; later these methods were put
into the general framework of Gro¨bner basis algorithms [5, 85, 3]. There has been particular focus
on equations over GF2 and other small fields [28, 91, 57, 16, 9]. It is difficult to estimate how fast
these methods will work for our system. There has been theoretical and empirical work estimating
how fast these methods work on m random quadratic equations over n variables (and in particular
for GF2), but these estimates are available only in the limits m = n+ k (k constant) and m = cn
(c constant) [10] and are not in a form we can see how to extrapolate from. (Encouragingly, in
the latter case the conclusion is that such systems are a good source of hardness for cryptography.)
These studies have continued apace [38, 9] but even the most recent of these gives estimates only
for m up to O(n).
In the absence of a guideline from recent studies, we fall back on an extrapolation of estimates
from [27, 28]. Since the estimates predate some developments in Gro¨bner basis algorithms and
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some analyses (empirical and theoretical) of the “degree of regularity” of systems of quadratic
equations (this being the key unknown parameter in the runtimes of these algorithms), and since
we are extrapolating from estimates that were apparently focused on values of m/n2 smaller than
in our application, the value we provide is quite likely to be inaccurate. In any case, the estimate
(see [27] Sec. 6.5 or [28] Sec. 4.1; in the latter, the parameter µ explicitly captures the uncertainty
in the estimate, and our numbers make sense if it is larger than any inverse polynomial) is for a
runtime of ∼ 2n/
√
m. (We have simplified the expressions from the references due to the leaps of
extrapolation). Thus, with the setting m = n1+α, this gives a very rough time estimate of 2n
(1−α)/2
.
We hope that subsequent work will give more reliable estimates.
4.3 Structure of slices of T
As has been noted, the rank of the tensor T generated in the “plain” variant is fairly small,
m = n1+α for the constant α used in the construction.
One obvious question is whether at this very low rank, it is possible to infer something about the
vectors {ui}m1 , {vi}m1 simply by looking at individual slices of T . For slices we have all the tools of
linear algebra at our disposal.
We now show that the answer to this question is negative.
Proposition 6. For m = cn, c > 2, the distribution on each slice of T is within variation distance
21−(c−2)n of the uniform distribution on n× n matrices.
Proof. Consider the group of n× n F-matrices under addition; this is isomorphic to (Z/2)n2 . The
characters of the group are in bijective correspondence with matrices M ,
χM (N) = (−1)
∑
1≤i,j≤nMijNij .
We are implementing a random walk on this group: a single step is an addition of u ⊗ v for u, v
uniformly distributed. Letting P be this single-step distribution on the group, we are to show that
P convolved with itself m times is close to uniform. Write
χM (P ) = 2
−2n∑
u,v
(−1)
∑
1≤i,j≤nMijuivj .
For nonzero M , fix any nonzero row i of M . For any v such that
∑
Mijvj = 1 mod 2 (which is
true of half the vectors v), the involution u → u + ei (flipping the i’th bit) is a bijection between
pairs (u, v) with
∑
1≤i,j≤nMijuivj = 0 mod 2 and pairs (u, v) with
∑
1≤i,j≤nMijuivj = 1 mod 2.
Consequently,
−1/2 ≤ χM (P ) ≤ 1/2.
A more careful version of this argument is to consider v according to whether or not its dot product
with every row of M is 0. If this is the case, then for every u,
∑
1≤i,j≤nMijuivj = 0 mod 2. If this
is not the case, then the same involution argument may be applied to the first row of M for which
the dot product is 1. Therefore,
χM (P ) = 2
− rankM .
Taking m steps of this walk gives a distribution P ∗m whose Fourier coefficients are
χM (P
∗m) = 2−m rankM .
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The Fourier coefficient of the uniform distribution is also 1 at M = 0, and is 0 elsewhere, so the
variation distance of our distribution from uniform is equal to
2−n
2
∑
N
∣∣∣∣∣∣
∑
M 6=0
2−m rankM (−1)
∑
1≤i,j≤nMijNij
∣∣∣∣∣∣ .
The number of matrices M of rank r is bounded by 22nr (this is a wasteful estimate for large r but
no matter), so the variation distance is
≤2−n2
∑
N
∣∣∣∣∣
n∑
r=1
22nr2−mr
∣∣∣∣∣
=
n∑
r=1
2(2−c)nr
≤21−(c−2)n
(Incidentally, observe that almost all of the contribution comes from the rank-one Fourier coeffi-
cients.) 2
A simple extension of this argument shows that any small number of slices are, for sufficient c,
distributed exponentially close to the uniform distribution. It is not clear exactly how quickly c
must grow as a function of the number of slices in order to ensure near-uniformity. But the essential
question is whether there is any efficient algorithm to reveal something about the collection {ui}m1 ,
{vi}m1 by examining several slices in combination (a number growing fast enough in n for the
above distribution to be non-uniform). This seems unpromising because so much information has
been lost; a small collection of slices is not so nearly “abnormal” (as compared with the uniform
distribution) as the full tensor. In any case the “+” variant of the method which we next describe is
very well protected from this approach because any collection of m−21n slices is actually uniformly
distributed.
4.4 LRTD vulnerability and the “+” variant
4.4.1 LRTD
Whereas the MinRank attack tries (essentially) to obtain the private key, it would be sufficient,
instead, to find a slightly inferior substitute: a decomposition of the tensor T as the sum of m′
rank 1 tensors, for m′ not too much larger than m. Then an exhaustive search over the values of
m′−m “missing equations” would enable us to invert the bilinear mapping. (In a sense this attack
is converse to MinRank: instead of trying to write the rank-1 matrices {ui ⊗ vi}i as combinations
of the slices of T , one tries to write the slices T as combinations of some other rank-1 matrices.)
Define the following problem:
Definition 7. The (n,m,m′)-LRTD problem (low-rank tensor decomposition problem, LRTD) is:
given T sampled from the distribution Dn,m, write T as an (n, n,m;m
′)-tensor.
For the security of the “plain” variant trap-door what we need, then, is that for some β > 0 (as
large as possible), (n,m,m+ nβ)-LRTD cannot be solved in less than time 2n
β
.
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As far as we are aware, there is no polynomial-time algorithm which has better than a 2−nΩ(1)
probability of solving even the (n, n1+α, n2/4)-LRTD-problem, that is, giving a decomposition in
n2/4 terms of a tensor known to require just n1+α terms (0 < α < 1).
(“LRTD” without parameters will simply mean the problem of finding an approximately-optimal-
rank decomposition of a tensor that is, indeed, of low rank.)
In any case however the following trap-door variant is better protected against LRTD attacks.
4.4.2 Trap-door: “+” variant
MQ cryptosystems can be modified in a number of standard ways: see [90]. Of these we draw
attention to the “+” variant, which reduces a weakness mentioned in the previous subsection,
namely, that to crack the plain variant it is sufficient to have a tensor decomposition algorithm
that is effective in the special case that the rank is equal to the longest dimension of the tensor.
As we have seen, in that case, due to the connection to MinRank, there is a specialized approach
to LRTD. It is of course possible that there are others. Our “+” variant reduces this exposure.
The basic idea is simple: augment the tensor T with additional “noise” slices, each slice being an
independent uniformly random n×n matrix. The simplest option would be to place these slices in
a uniformly random subset of the coordinates along the third axis of T (with the identity of this
subset being part of the private key), but instead we use the following slightly better method.
Set m = n1+α and m1 = m− 21n. Set W0 ∼= F21n, and let {ei}(1 ≤ i ≤ 21n) be a basis for W0. Set
W1 ∼= Fm1 and W = W0×W1. Now sample the tensor T as follows: (a) For 1 ≤ i ≤ 21n select ui, vi
uniformly from U , V respectively, and set T0 =
∑
ui⊗vi⊗ei. (b) Select T1 ∈ U ⊗V ⊗W1 from the
uniform distribution. (c) Select g3 ∈ GL(W ) uniformly at random and set T = (T0 × T1)(1, 1, g3).
The private key now consists of g3 and all the ui, vi. The honest inverter applies g
−1
3 , then ignores
the information in W1 and inverts as in the plain variant. Following through the calculation in
Sec. 3.3 we have:
Theorem 8. With probability ≥ 1− 2−n (over the choice of the private key), the bilinear mapping
is invertible by the above procedure on the images of all inputs x 6= 0, y 6= 0.
2
Unlike in the “plain” variant, it is no longer obviously sufficient for an adversary to possess an
algorithm for low-rank tensor decomposition, because, due to the noise, the public-key tensor has
rank almost as high as a uniformly random tensor.
5 Discussion
1. We have used the parametrization m = n1+α which balances the MinRank and relinearization
attacks. The former runs in time ∼ 2nα ; the runtime of the latter is less clear but we have
tentatively used the figure ∼ 2n(1−α)/2 . (We are not aware of any really effective LRTD
attacks.) We can balance the above figures with the selection α = 1/3. This will likely
change as the quality of the attacks becomes clearer.
2. A key question which our work motivates is, whether quantum algorithms offer any advan-
tage over classical ones for the problem of solving systems of polynomial equations. This
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question should be understood not only in a worst-case complexity sense but more broadly,
and especially w.r.t. the types of instance distributions provided by cryptosystems.
3. A desirable argument for the security of the trap-door proposal would be to reduce an appar-
ently hard problem to cracking it—most obviously, of course, MinRank, or perhaps LRTD,
in some parameter range. A difficulty in doing this is that the image of the bilinear mapping
is exponentially sparse.
4. Even in the absence of such a reduction, it would be encouraging for the security of the trap-
door to strengthen H˚astad’s theorem by showing (even worst-case) hardness of the tensor
decomposition problem (or at least its decision version) for r′ slightly higher than the true
rank r, even r′ = r + log n or r + polylog n. The truth probably extends to large constant
factors (e.g., 100r) and possibly even to powers (e.g., r1.1).
As has been pointed out in [4], good inapproximability results for tensor rank (in this case,
just for the value of the rank, not necessarily for finding an actual decomposition) are likely
hard to come by, since they would (at least by deterministic reductions) imply construction
of explicit tensors with high rank; currently, in spite of substantial efforts, the best known
construction (over F) is of n × n × n tensors with rank 3n − o(n) [77, 4, 88]. However, as
noted above, for our purpose even a very weak inapproximability result would provide some
support for the security of the trap-door.
5. There is empirical evidence for the hardness of the tensor decomposition problem from work on
efficiently computing bilinear problems, including integer multiplication and, most notably,
matrix multiplication. The essential target of that work has been, indeed, to obtain low
rank decompositions of some specific families of tensors. And, just as for this cracking this
cryptosystem, it is not necessary for that goal to find decompositions that achieve the exact
rank of the tensor; decompositions which are not too much larger are also useful. It is
therefore notable that upper bounds for the matrix multiplication exponent improved only
incrementally despite efforts spanning two decades [82, 62, 13, 63, 64, 73, 65, 72, 24, 83, 84, 25],
then stalled entirely for another two decades, until two small improvements recently with
considerable computational investment [81, 89]. (Perhaps another sign of the hardness of the
decomposition problem is that, after the first few papers, efforts ceased to upper bound the
rank directly; progress on the exponent came through improved upper bounds on the border
rank, a number that can be smaller but still gives an equivalent-exponent algorithm, with
some additional constant-factor overhead.)
6. It is worth comparing the (honest) inversion time in our system with that in HFE. In HFE,
the dominant step in the runtime is factoring a univariate polynomial over a finite field.
The corresponding HFE runtime depends upon assumptions about the parameters in the
cryptosystem. One parameter is the degree of a small field extension, and for purpose of
comparison we suppose this parameter equals 1. The other, d, is the degree of the underlying
univariate polynomial, and is a security parameter; it is therefore fairly large, at least in the
thousands. The runtime of the current leading factoring algorithm over small fields [87] (at
least asymptotically and in most ranges of the parameters) is then O(d1.5+o(1) + d1+o(1)n).
By contrast the runtime of our inversion procedure is O(n2+α + M(n)), where n2+α = mn
accounts for the matrix-vector multiplication which converts z to s (note that we produce only
enough bits of s so that with high probability x and y are determined), and M(n) is the time
for computing a selected-inverse of each of the two n×bn matrices formed from the vectors in
{ui}i∈I and {vi}i∈I (see Sec. 3.3). By selected-inverse we mean the inverse of any nonsingular
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n× n minor. Since a randomly chosen n× 2n minor is likely to have rank n, M(n) is O(nω)
where ω as before is the linear algebra computation exponent, currently ω < 2.3727. (The
inputs are large enough that at least Strassen’s method may be effective, see [8], and we may
benefit from the fact that some processors are optimized for linear algebra computations.)
Since n is at least in the hundreds, the honest inversion runtimes in the two systems are
arguably in the same ballpark. We do not feel confident saying more at present. Better
comparison depends on better understanding of the relative security of the two methods,
so that the scalings between d, n,m can be adjusted to compare runtimes when controlling
for the amount of time required to crack the system. (Of course it is also possible that in
time there will be improvements in linear algebra and polynomial factoring algorithms; the
ultimate exponent could be 2 for both problems. Such developments would affect runtimes
for both honest inversion and attack.)
A similar issue arises in considering the evaluation time, which in our method is n3+α (equal to
the size of the public key). Again this cannot be evaluated in isolation because the underlying
parameter is not “n”, but bits of security (logarithm of attack runtime).
7. The constructions we’ve described have obvious generalizations to tensors of order higher
than 3. (“Multivariate cubic” systems, etc.) It is likely, although difficult to assess, that
higher order increases security; unfortunately it also increases encryption time and public key
size. Therefore d = 2 is the preferred choice unless it transpires that security is significantly
better for larger d.
This draft is being posted on the IACR Cryptology ePrint Archive. Comments are welcome to
schulman@caltech.edu.
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